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Comparative Analysis of VNSA Complex Engineering Efforts
Abstract
The case studies undertaken in this special issue demonstrate unequivocally that, despite
being forced to operate clandestinely and facing the pressures of security forces seeking to
hunt them down and neutralize them, at least a subset of violent non-state actors (VNSAs)
are capable of some genuinely impressive feats of engineering. At the same time, success
in such endeavours is not guaranteed and VNSAs will undoubtedly face a number of
obstacles along the way. A comparative analysis of the cases also reveals new insights
about the factors influencing the decision to pursue complex engineering efforts, the
implementation of such decisions and the determinants of the ultimate outcome. These
result in a set of hypotheses and indicators that, if confirmed by future research, can
contribute to both operational and strategic intelligence assessments. Overall, the current
study enriches our understanding of how and why VNSAs might engage in complex
engineering efforts.
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Introduction
Close observers – whether in law enforcement, intelligence agencies or
academia – of particular terrorist groups and transnational criminal
organizations (TCOs) have long been aware of the technical prowess
sometimes displayed by their subjects. Yet, those who study violent non-state
actors (VNSAs) more broadly, where the relatively straightforward
application of firearms, explosives and telecommunications are the
overwhelming norm, can sometimes be misled into viewing these exploits as
the limit of VNSA capabilities.1 The preceding cases, however, have
demonstrated unequivocally that, despite being forced to operate
clandestinely and facing the pressures of security forces seeking to hunt them
down and neutralize them, at least a subset of VNSAs have shown themselves
to be capable of some genuinely impressive feats of engineering. If these
cases (the basic features of which are shown in Table 1) do nothing more than
give pause to those who too easily dismiss the potential threats posed by nonstate actors, they will have served a useful purpose.
Table 1: Summary of Case Study Features
PIRA
Complex
Engineering
Effort
Overall
Outcome
Type of
Organization
General Motive
Regional
Context

Sophisticated
mortar systems

Successful

Aum
Shinrikyo
Chemical
weapons;
Nuclear
Weapons
Chemical:
Limited success;
Nuclear:
Unsuccessful

FARC

Zetas

HAMAS

"Narco-subs"

Encrypted
countrywide
radio network

Operational
tunnel network
into Israel

Successful

Successful

TCO

Terrorist
Ethnonationalist;
Islamist

Ethnonationalist

Terrorist / Cult
ApocalypticMillenarian

Successful
Terrorist /
TCO
Marxist;
Financial gain

Western Europe

Asia

South America

Terrorist

Financial gain
North
America

Middle East

Successful
Smuggling
network
Financial gain
International

For a complete discussion of the literature and theory surrounding complex engineering
efforts by VNSAs, as well as the methodology and case selection process, see the
Introduction to this Special Issue.
2 As described in the Introduction to the Special Issue, the AQ Khan network is presented
not as a case of complex engineering itself, but rather as an example of how an illicit
network might facilitate and support such an effort. It is therefore analyzed separately
from the other cases for most purposes in this analysis and is differentiated from the
other cases in the table with italics.
1
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AQ Khan
Network2
Illicit transfer of
nuclear
equipment and
designs
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Decision
Still, the case studies have a lot more to offer in terms of providing insights
into the characteristics that are associated with VNSA complex engineering
efforts. Beginning with the decision to engage in complex engineering efforts,
Table 2 below summarizes several aspects of the decision making process
across the case studies (the A.Q. Khan nuclear case will be discussed
separately). For the general context in which decisions were made, in all
cases the actual decision to engage in the complex engineering effort was
made by the central decision-making body in each organization. Irrespective
of who actually carried out the effort, in all cases the organization’s senior
leadership had to at least give the go-ahead. While there might have been
consultation with and input from lower level organizational personnel, it
appears that since the effort under consideration represented a major new
initiative, requiring the investment of substantial organizational resources
and often entailing sizeable risks, it was not left up to functional entities or
field commanders to make the key decisions, which occurred in a top-down
fashion.
Another common feature across all the cases was the high risk tolerance
displayed by the organization’s decision makers more generally. While the
small number of cases and the absence of negative examples make it difficult
to state that a high tolerance for risk is either necessary or sufficient for
deciding to engage in a complex engineering effort, it is striking that none of
the VNSAs studied could be characterized as being operationally conservative
in any way. Moreover, a perceived urgency to act did not seem to color most
of the VNSA decision making. While leaders may have perceived a clear
strategic need to do something different, in no case (with the exception of
Aum Shinrikyo, which had a prophesized deadline only a few years hence)
was there evidence that the leaders felt the need to make the decision quickly
or rashly. Embarking on a complex engineering effort was therefore mostly a
reasoned decision, one that likely estimated the various costs and benefits
involved.
Turning to the key question of what factors contributed to the decisions
themselves, while the specifics vary considerably across the VNSAs studied,
there are several commonalities in the overall motivational formula. This can
be discerned by viewing the interacting effects of different levels of motivation
that underlie the decision to engage in a complex engineering effort. Across
the cases, (1) the basic motivational disposition of the VNSA itself exerts the
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broadest stimulus by determining more proximate strategic goals. It is these
goals that (2) in turn produce the tactical requirements that (3), often in
reaction to external circumstances, then provide the impetus for the
organization to make a change in its operations. Lastly, it appears that (4) a
variety of contingent and contextual factors influence the selection of a
particular solution to the operational problem that involves a complex
technology, as well as the decision to engage in an internal engineering effort
to obtain this technology. For example, in the case of the PIRA, their
fundamentally ethnonationalist conflict against the British pushed them to
attack police and military targets, which in turn sparked a search to tactically
overcome the high-walled fortifications surrounding these targets, while
several contextual factors, including particular tactical requirements in an
urban environment and a distrust of externally sourced armaments, led them
to pursue their own mortar systems. Similarly, the FARC, which had evolved
to pursue financial gain, was driven to make operational changes by increased
interdiction rates by counternarcotics authorities, while the advantages in
terms of carrying capacity and detection avoidance, together with a high
return on investment, prompted the decision to pursue a submersible
development program.
Table 2: Decision Characteristics
PIRA

Decision
Makers
Decision
Process
General Risk
Tolerance
Perceived
Urgency

Motivation for
Change

Aum Shinrikyo

FARC

Zetas
Heriberto LazcanoLazcano (with
Antonio CardenasGuillen,
JorgeCostillaSanchez)

HAMAS

Top-down

Top-down

Extremely topdown, centralized

General Secretariat
and Joint Western
Command
Top-down (with
some bottom-up
input from
individual fronts)

High

Very High

High

High

High

Moderate

High
Overthrow
Japanese
government and
initiate doomsday;
leader's fetish-like
affinity for
unconventional
weapons

Low

Low

Low

Counteract
improved detection
/ interdiction
efforts by
authorities

Better operational
coordination and
intelligence
gathering than
rivals

To address military
imbalance
asymmetrically and
penetrate defenses

Army Council
Mainly top-down,
centralized for
mortars (with some
bottom-up input)

Destroy fortified
targets

Shoko Asahara
(leader)
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Al-Qassam Brigades
(esp. Mohammed
Deif)
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Key Drivers of
Internal
Development
of Specific CE
Long-Term
Investment in
CE

(1) Specific tactical
requirements not
met by available
products (other
weapons or military
mortars)
(2) External sources
largely unavailable
(3) Distrust of
externally sourced
material
(4) DIY prestige
(5) Confidence in
technical prowess
(6) Allowed for
tactical/strategic
evolution
Yes

(1) Failure to
procure weapons
from external
sources
(2) Copious
financial resources
(3) Confidence in
leader's prophecies
Chemical:
Somewhat; Nuclear:
No

(1) Tactical
advantages over
alternatives in
terms of avoiding
detection
(2) High return on
investment
(3) Resale / rental
opportunities

(1) Existing
infrastructure
inadequate for its
needs
(2) Military
background of
leaders (desire for
efficiency and
precision)
(3) Possessed
sufficient resources
(cost tens of
millions of dollars)
(4) Prestige
(messaging to
rivals; government)

(1) Prior experience
in building tunnels
(2) Covert
penetration of
Israel
(3) Provide
protection
(weapons storage
and leadership)
(4) Provide (busy)
work for Hamas
members and boost
morale
(5) Limited tactical
support from state
sponsors

Yes

Yes

Yes

One salient motivational factor to note is that in every case studied, the desire
on the part of the VNSA to alter its operational posture was prompted by
some change in the VNSA’s strategic or tactical environment, whether it is an
electoral loss (as in the case of Aum Shinrikyo), or the persistence of multiple
rivals in illicit markets (as in the case of the Zetas). It can thus be
hypothesized that complex engineering efforts by VNSAs are much less likely
to arise spontaneously where an organization perceives itself to be enjoying
tactical and strategic success in terms of reaching its immediate goals.
A second hypothesis suggested by the cases is that a complex engineering task
is more likely to be undertaken in the absence of any simple alternatives that
will solve the operational problem that the VNSA is confronted with. This
accords with the general theory that VNSAs tend to be conservative and
imitative in their operations and will in most instances pursue the path of
least resistance. A corollary to the hypothesis is that a complex technology
will usually be sought only if there exists no simple technology that will suffice
and that a VNSA will usually decide to engage in an internal engineering
effort to acquire the technology only if no external suppliers are readily
available or if external supply poses too many security risks.
It also appears that, even though the VNSAs studied were willing to take large
risks, they did not undertake complex engineering projects on the off chance
that they might be successful. In all the cases studied, leaders seem to have
made the final decision to embark on such an effort only if they had at least
some degree of confidence in their groups’ ability to pull it off. Whether the
source of this confidence lay in having copious resources, professional cadre,
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prior experience in similar technical areas, or even a delusional faith in
prophecy (as in the case of Aum Shinrikyo), the decision was made based on
some expectation of success, at least in the long run. Another hypothesis is
therefore that a positive decision to pursue a complex engineering effort will
be far more likely if factors can be identified that might boost leaders’
confidence in their efforts’ ultimate success.
In at least two of the cases (the PIRA and Los Zetas), the desire for prestige
likely played some role in the decision. Here, the very act of the VNSA
undertaking a complex, risky and resource-intensive effort might have been
perceived as valuable in terms of messaging to opponents, rivals or followers
that the organization was one to be reckoned with. While likely neither to be
a necessary nor sufficient criterion, it can thus be hypothesized that where an
organization is especially concerned with its image as a sophisticated,
innovative actor, a desire for prestige can be a powerful facilitating factor in
the decision to engage in a complex engineering effort.
The case studies support many of the broader findings and theories of how
and when VNSAs decide to innovate, as outlined in the introductory article.
Several of the drivers of innovation mentioned in the literature, such as
countermeasures by security forces and a greater desire for status, are
reflected in the cases. So is causal variation in the decision making, although
the cases of complex engineering efforts presented in this volume point
towards a more generalizable decision framework (as described above) than is
discernible in the broader VNSA innovation context. The importance placed
in the literature on a willingness to take risks and organizational learning is
also echoed by the case studies. Another factor is the facilitative effect of
internal champions, which is alluded to in several of the cases. However,
because the champions in the cases tended to coincide with the senior
leadership of the VNSAs, it is not possible to identify an independent effect of
internal or external champions.
Factors identified in the literature on VNSA innovation that were not
supported (but also not contradicted) by the majority of the case studies were:
The effects of demonstration of the technology by other VNSAs3 on the
decision to pursue a complex engineering efforts (since most of the complex
engineering efforts had never been undertaken by VNSAs previously),
whether a self-sustaining momentum developed that would have continued to
drive the efforts even in the absence of the initial stimuli, and the extent to
The Hamas case did reflect this factor, however, in that its ally Hezbollah as well as its
rival Fatah had previously constructed tunnels.
3
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which the possession of institutionalized R&D organs or safe havens
contributed towards the decision to engage in these efforts. However, related
to this last area, possessing high levels of resources seem to be particularly
important in the context of the decision to proceed with a complex
engineering effort, which would not necessarily be the case with broader
VNSA innovation. Given the selection of case studies of only positive
decisions to pursue, several findings in the literature, such as the
disincentives for innovating in the presence of internal discord or high
pressures from security forces, could not be explored in the current study.

Implementation
The case studies make perhaps their greatest contribution with respect to
exploring the implementation of complex engineering efforts by VNSAs, given
that there is scant existing literature on this topic. Table 3 summarizes the
implementation aspects examined across the five relevant cases. First, from
the time frames over which implementation occurred, it is immediately
apparent that complex engineering tasks are not generally implemented very
quickly, at least not to the extent that they return results that can be regarded
as unqualified successes. It appears to take a minimum of several years’
worth of effort to yield even modestly successful outcomes (as in the cases of
Aum’s chemical weapons), and can take upwards of a decade or more to
achieve the fully-realized outcomes initially envisaged by group leaders (as in
the cases of PIRA mortars and FARC “narco-submarines”). It can thus be
hypothesized that complex engineering efforts by VNSAs take a considerable
amount of time, at least relative to the highly dynamic environment within
which most VNSAs operate. If confirmed, this would suggest that law
enforcement, intelligence and military agencies have a sizeable window in
which to detect and interdict such efforts.
Table 3: Implementation Characteristics
PIRA
Time Frame

Location

Primary
Implementer

1970-1990s
Various in Republic
of Ireland; also N.
Ireland and maybe
England

Engineering
Department

Aum Shinrikyo

FARC

Zetas

HAMAS

Chemical: 1990-1995;
Nuclear: 1992-1993

1992-present

2006-2012

Circa 2007present

Various facilities in
Japan and farm in
Australia

Sanquianga and
Buenaventura
Regions, Colombia

Majority of Mexico's
31 states

Joint Western
Command

Technical team (~20
people) led by Jose
Estrada; assisted by
local plaza bosses

"Ministry of
Construction";
"Ministry of Science
and Technology"
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Technical
Expertise
Needed

Explosives;
machining;
propulsion /
aerodynamics

Chemical
engineering; nuclear
physics; metallurgy;
mechanical
engineering

Key Source of
Expertise

Professionallytrained members
(incl. engineers);
military manuals &
personnel; trial and
error

Recruitment of
professionallytrained members;
outside consultants;
the Internet

Key Source of
Materials /
Equipment

Legitimate
purchase; state
sponsor (Libya)

Legitimate purchase
(?)

Legitimate purchase
by plaza bosses

Limited (individual
subcontractors)

Gulf Cartel (for a
time)

Hezbollah; Iran;
Gulf states

High

Low

Low

Unknown (likely
moderate)

High

Moderate

High

Design flaws

Government
counter-operations;
difficult terrain

Perseverance;
technical
improvements from
new expertise

Perseverance replaced seized /
destroyed
equipment;
expanded
infrastructure in
rural areas

Legitimate purchase
through front
companies
Networks of scientists
and officials in
Russia, US and
elsewhere, often
accessed through
front companies

Concern with
Security

Obstacles
Encountered

Accuracy; safety;
detonation
reliability

Moderate
Lack of access to
nuclear materials;
design flaws in
chemical production
and delivery

Perseverance;
technical
improvements

Switch from nuclear
back to chemical (and
biological); increased
resource investment
to correct design
flaws

Concern with
Safety

Response to
Obstacles

Telecommunications
engineers; hardware
/ software expertise.

Initially, hiring
technicians; later,
kidnapping and
coercion

Second, and acting to some extent in a countervailing fashion to the previous
point about windows of opportunity for law enforcement and intelligence,
across all of the cases the complex engineering efforts studied took place in
125
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Geology; structural
engineering;
electrical
engineering;
mining

Prior experience
with smuggling
tunnels; assistance
from Hezbollah
(perhaps indirectly
Iran and N. Korea)
Illegitimate
(Egyptian
smuggling tunnels)
and legitimate
purchase

Limited (high
explosives from
Libya)
Less concern early
period; more
concern later
(moderate overall)
Low in Rep. of
Ireland; High in
Northern Ireland
and elsewhere

Collaboration

Technical design and
construction (e.g.,
engineers, welders,
electricians, fiberglass
installers); experts in
navigation
equipment;
experienced seafarers
Professionallytrained members;
Colombian navy
personnel;
subcontractors
(Russian, Sri Lankan,
Pakistani engineers);
coerced naval
engineers

Detection of
building activities;
maintenance
requirements
Perseverance;
more
inconspicuous
methods (e.g.,
digging by hand);
devoted extensive
resources to
maintenance
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locations wherein the VNSAs could operate in relative security, with a good
chance of remaining unmolested. The PIRA enjoyed some degree of
sanctuary in the Republic of Ireland while developing their mortars; Aum
Shinrikyo was protected by the Japanese government’s reticence to scrutinize
religious movements and the isolation of their Australian property; FARC
conducted its “narco-sub” operations in inaccessible jungle areas; the Zetas
enjoyed near impunity in many regions of Mexico where corruption had
infested civil society; and Hamas controlled the territory of Gaza when it built
its operational tunnels. The existence of VNSA safe havens can therefore be
hypothesized to complicate counterterrorist or counter-criminal attempts to
detect or interrupt complex engineering efforts.
Third, in terms of who within the VNSA is tasked with implementing the
complex engineering effort, in almost all the cases the responsibility was
given to a specialist technical or logistical organ in the group, whether this
was institutionalized (as in the cases of the PIRA, Hamas, and Aum
Shinrikyo) on a broader scale in the organizational structure or more ad-hoc
(as in the cases of FARC and the Zetas). Complex engineering efforts by their
very nature are highly technical and will almost always represent a radical
departure from standard operating procedures within the VNSA. This accords
with the more general theory that dedicated, separate R&D organs can bolster
the chances of success when VNSAs choose to innovate; indeed, in the context
of complex engineering efforts, this might be more of a requirement than a
facilitating factor. The existence of a well-resourced, specialized entity
endorsed by the leadership might thus be a necessary precondition for any
serious attempt to realize a complex engineering effort, which in turn might
provide specific, moderately diagnostic indicators4 for intelligence analysts
observing the VNSA.
Fourth, with respect to the types of expertise needed, these vary considerably
across cases, although—as is to be expected—various types of engineering
(including electrical, aeronautical, chemical, structural and mechanical)
feature prominently. Much of the required expertise appears to have come
from professionals who had been previously trained, whether this could be
found among existing members (as in the PIRA and Hamas cases), members
specially recruited for their expertise (as in the case of Aum), hired
consultants (in the case of FARC), external actors lending assistance (Hamas),
or even coerced technicians (in the cases of FARC and Los Zetas). While there
was also some internal development of expertise, for example by sending
Heuer, Richards, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Langley, VA: Center for the Study
of Intelligence, 1999).
4
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members for professional training (PIRA) or a process of trial and error
(PIRA and Hamas), it can be hypothesized that in most cases VNSA complex
engineering efforts will involve some degree of externally-sourced
professional expertise, at least if the organization is keen on keeping the
length of the development cycle to a minimum. Thus, contrary to the
literature on general VNSA innovation, professional technical expertise,
beyond a generally proficient and stable membership, might be necessary. If
confirmed, this can provide opportunities for detection of complex
engineering activities by VNSAs.
Conversely, when it comes to the source of needed materials, in almost every
case at least a significant portion of these materials were purchased from
commercial suppliers, albeit often under the pretext of legitimate commerce,
e.g., through front companies. While there was some assistance from state
sponsors (in the case of Hamas and the PIRA), and some acquisition from
illicit networks, in none of the cases studied was there outright theft to obtain
materials, which would have provided a useful indicator of activity. If the
reliance on legitimate purchase for materials applies more broadly than the
cases studied, this potentially makes it more difficult for intelligence and law
enforcement agencies to detect most complex engineering efforts through
material acquisition activities, unlike the case with, say small arms, explosives
and nuclear materials acquisition.
Fifth, although many of the cases involved at least some collaboration with
outside entities, except for the professional expertise provided from outside
(which generally occurred on an individual basis), it appears as if
collaboration with outside actors, such as states or other VNSAs was not
entirely necessary. For example, Libya provided the PIRA with high
explosives, which certainly assisted in their production of mortars, but even
before this, the PIRA had succeeded in creating operational mortars using
home-made explosives. Similarly, while Hezbollah may have assisted Hamas
in designing attack tunnels, Hamas had decades of internal Palestinian
experience with smuggling tunnels to draw upon.
Sixth, organizational concern with the safety of general VNSA members
involved in complex engineering efforts is variable across the cases, although
it is interesting to note that the only group which unequivocally paid careful
attention to its members’ safety was Aum Shinrikyo, which was also arguably
the least successful of the cases studied in terms of its complex engineering
endeavors. This does not necessarily contradict the assertion in the literature
that key members with technical skills and experience will be protected, since
127
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the cases mostly do not reveal how the safety of these key implementers was
regarded within the organization. In the related matter of how much
operational security VNSAs employed during their complex engineering
efforts, this was generally moderate to high, with the key determinant
apparently the degree to which the organization believed itself to be
vulnerable to security forces.
The last aspect of implementation and a particularly important one involves
the obstacles experienced during the process and how the VNSAs responded
to these obstacles. It is immediately apparent from the cases that, as
expected, almost any endeavor undertaken by a VNSA that qualifies as a
complex engineering effort is almost certain to face at least some obstacles
along the path from conception to execution. One assumption, which spans
the relevant literature and which applies to all of the obstacles discussed
below, is that as the complex engineering task in question becomes more
complex and more technically demanding, the potential obstacles become
greater in number and severity. While the case studies do not confirm this
assumption as such, they certainly do not contradict it either. In every case
studied, the VNSA under consideration experienced at least one (and often
more) serious impediments to success. These ranged from defects in design
(e.g., PIRA and FARC), lack of access to materials (Aum Shinrikyo), operating
in difficult terrain (Los Zetas) and having to avoid government forces during
implementation (Los Zetas and Hamas).
However, in the case of all but Aum, a common thread amongst the various
responses was perseverance in the effort despite setbacks. It was only in the
Aum Shinrikyo case of nuclear weapons where the group abandoned their
plans and switched back to chemical and biological agents; it might not be
coincidental that this is the organization that ultimately enjoyed possibly the
least success from a purely engineering point of view. Besides perseverance,
the VNSAs employed a variety of means to overcome obstacles, including
making iterative technical improvements, bringing on additional expertise,
replacing infrastructure lost to security force activity and increasing their
resource investment in the project. Each of these, however, can be seen as an
adaptation to an internal or external impediment. It can be hypothesized that
VNSAs that possess sufficient fortitude to persevere in the face of setbacks
and that have the capacity to devote additional resources (including
personnel, equipment, and funding) to a complex engineering effort are far
more likely to succeed in the face of almost inevitable obstacles. Conversely,
those VNSAs who lack suitable depth in motivation and capability are
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hypothesized to be far less likely to succeed in complex engineering efforts in
general.

Outcome
Most of the cases studied (with the notable exception of Aum’s nuclear
program) represent successful attempts by VNSAs to engage in complex
engineering efforts. Table 4 encapsulates the major factors identified in each
case study as being primarily responsible for the outcome of the complex
engineering effort. The VNSAs under examination pursued very different
types of technology as part of these efforts. Yet, while each case had some
unique determinants of success, from the cases as a whole we can identify
four key elements that in general might be expected to increase the
probability of a VNSA being successful in a complex engineering endeavor.
Table 4: Outcome Summary
Case

Outcome

Main Determinants of Outcome

PIRA

Success

Aum

Chemical:
Limited
Success
Nuclear:
Failure

(a) Organizational and individual expertise and access to materials
(b) Safe haven
(c) Culture of learning
Chemical:
(a) High resources
(b) Safe haven (protected as a religion under Japanese law)
(c) Technical personnel, but insufficiently skilled
Nuclear:
(a) Self-imposed ideological deadline
(b) Lack of physics knowledge and practical expertise in nuclear engineering

FARC

Success

(a) Financial and human resources
(b) Safe havens (inaccessible areas)
(c) Culture of learning / long-term strategy
(d) Influence over populace

Zetas

Success

HAMAS Success

(a) High resources
(b) Ruthless efficiency and esprit d'corps
(a) High resource investment
(b) Prior experience with smuggling tunnels
(c) Culture of Learning

(a) Unfamiliar environment for intelligence agencies
AQ
Success (in (b) Concealment activities
Khan
terms of
(c) Venal suppliers
Network smuggling) (d) Lack of political will to prevent activities

1. Substantial investment of resources. The very nature of complex
engineering efforts means that they will invariably require significant
amounts of both human and financial resources to undertake. This is
especially true when one considers the inevitable obstacles that will
129
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arise during any attempt to operationalize a new, complex process.
Not only must a VNSA possess (or be able to acquire) high levels of
resources, but it must be both willing and able to devote these
resources to the complex engineering effort, most likely maintaining
these levels over an extended period of time as the development
process matures. In at least four of the five case studies of complex
engineering efforts (Aum Shinrikyo, Los Zetas, FARC and Hamas), the
VNSAs possessed large amounts of fungible resources that could be
applied to the complex engineering effort without detracting
significantly from other activities, and even in the case of the PIRA, the
leadership was willing to devote a non-negligible proportion of its
resources to mortar development for more than two decades. A
corollary to this hypothesis is that a long-term commitment is needed
for most complex engineering efforts to succeed.
2. Technical Expertise. As in the more general case of innovation by
VNSAs, the transfer or development of the required technical
knowledge and practical skills played a central role in determining
outcomes in the case studies.5 Whether by bringing in outside
expertise (e.g., FARC and Los Zetas) or developing their own through
trial-and-error (e.g., PIRA and Hamas), it is hypothesized that a VNSA
complex engineering effort is unlikely to succeed without acquiring the
appropriate amount of technical expertise for the effort at hand. In
most respects, there is no place for amateurs in complex engineering
efforts. The Aum Shinrikyo case exemplifies this—in the domain in
which the group possessed expertise, namely chemical engineering, it
was more successful, while in those areas where this expertise was
lacking, namely nuclear physics and nuclear engineering, it failed
miserably, despite the devotion of substantial resources and efforts in
that direction.

A more nuanced approach to this topic is to focus separately on the different knowledge
components embodied in technical skills. These can be separated into what Michael
Kenney characterizes as general technical knowledge (techne) and contextual,
experiential knowledge (mētis), both of which are argued to be crucial to successful
adoption of new technology. Kenney, Michael, “ ‘Dumb’ Yet Deadly: Local Knowledge and
Poor Tradecraft Among Islamist Militants in Britain and Spain,” Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, 33:10 (2010), 911-932; Ackerman, Gary, “‘More Bang for the Buck’:
Examining the Determinants of Terrorist Adoption of New Weapons Technologies” (PhD
Dissertation: King’s College London, 2014), 23, available at:
https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/32901277/2014_Ackerman_Gary_0715371_ethes
is.pdf, 87-90.
5
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3. Safe haven. As noted above, one feature shared by nearly all of the
VNSAs studied was that they were able to pursue their complex
engineering efforts over extended periods in circumstances where
direct engagement with security forces was unlikely. They were able to
engage in R&D in a relatively secure environment with relatively little
operational risk. A plausible hypothesis is thus that some measure of
safe haven is necessary for most VNSAs’ complex engineering efforts
to succeed.
4. Culture of learning. The last factor that seems to have played an
important role in more than one case is the ability of the VNSA to
identify the source of deficiencies in its efforts, and then to persevere
until a solution to the problem is found and executed. This ties into
the investment of resources in that it implies commitment to the effort
over an extended period of time.
It is at this stage that reference to the A.Q. Khan case study can be made. The
relevance of this case lies in how it demonstrates that VNSAs need not depend
on state actors for even the most highly technical and difficult to obtain
components and expertise required for complex engineering efforts. Driven
by the opportunity for financial gain, A.Q. Khan stood at the head of an illicit
non-state actor network that persisted for over fifteen years and spanned
more than twenty countries around the world. Although the Khan network
was provided with some cover by the Pakistani state, even when this
diminished, the network endured despite extensive nonproliferation efforts
by the major powers following the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.
Two of the main reasons for the continued success of A.Q. Khan in providing
nuclear equipment and expertise to a variety of customers (fortunately, none
of them non-state actors) were the willingness of legitimate suppliers to look
the other way in exchange for increased profit and the ability of the network
to move further up the supply chain to obtain more basic components that
were not controlled. Nor was the Khan case an anomaly. While it illustrates
that an illicit trading network could exist for even the most dangerous and
sophisticated technology, there are many other instances of non-state actor
networks supplying dangerous materials for profit, including the longstanding arms smuggling networks of Viktor Bout and Monzer Al-Kasser and
the biological agent exploits of Wouter Basson, the former head of the South
African chemical and biological weapons programs, who also “went rogue”
while enjoying the tacit protection of the state.
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Future Research Directions and Policy Implications
The case studies have provided several insights into the decision,
implementation and outcomes of complex engineering efforts as undertaken
by VNSAs. The observation that we are able to discern several common
elements—from similar decisional underpinnings to factors that facilitate
implementation—across very different cases reflecting different time periods,
geographic regions and motivations, indicates that VNSA complex
engineering efforts might be shaped by similar dynamics and subject to a
particular set of constraints. However, as noted in the introductory article to
the special issue, the case studies represent only an exploratory investigation
into the phenomenon. Although several hypotheses are suggested by the
cases, these hypotheses require confirmation through more robust testing
procedures before they can be fully utilized to shape policy and practice. In
addition to identifying and investigating additional cases of successful
complex engineering efforts by VNSAs, it will be necessary to explore multiple
instances of failed attempts to engage in complex engineering. This would
enable the use of several qualitative and quantitative methods, such as casecontrol sampling and Qualitative Comparative Analysis,6 to determine the
extent to which any of the hypothesized factors are necessary, sufficient or
merely strongly correlated with particular outcomes and indicators.
With respect to how this study can help to inform counterterrorist and law
enforcement policy and practice, if the above hypotheses are indeed
confirmed by further investigation, many of them can be directly employed as
observable indicators to show when a VNSA has the intent to engage in, or is
already engaging in, complex engineering efforts. This would be useful for
intelligence analysis at the operational level. For example, among the
potential indicators that might prove most useful in detecting and interdicting
VNSA complex engineering efforts are: (1) Changes in a VNSA’s strategic or
tactical environment for which no simple operational adaptation will
compensate and where there are no readily available suppliers of the
necessary technology; or (2) Attempts by a VNSA to recruit, hire, coerce or
otherwise acquire technical expertise.
The factors that point to an increased (or decreased) likelihood of a VNSA
engaging in, and especially succeeding in, complex engineering efforts can
For example, see Stolley, Paul and James Schlesselman, Case-control studies: Design,
Conduct, Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) and Rihoux, Benoȋt, and
Charles Ragin (eds.), Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative
Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.,
2009).
6
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also inform strategic threat assessments, both of particular VNSAs and of
classes of VNSAs such as transnational criminal organizations. Therefore,
further research might confirm that the VNSAs that are most likely to pursue
and succeed in complex engineering efforts are those which: (1) have a
penchant for taking risks; (2) are willing and able to devote substantial
resources to the effort for an extended period of time; (3) can conduct R&D
through a specialized organ in a location of relative security; (4) tend to
persevere in the face of setbacks; and (5) either already have, or can relatively
easily acquire, the necessary expertise.
Overall, the current study has enriched our understanding of how and why
VNSAs might engage in complex engineering efforts. It has shown that such
endeavors will undoubtedly face a number of obstacles and requirements and
thus hardly constitute faits accompli. Nonetheless, we must not
underestimate the ability of VNSAs to accomplish remarkable feats of
engineering in pursuit of their tactical and strategic goals. When
organizational conditions are right, almost any technical task, even the most
complex, become feasible for VNSAs.
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